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Abstract— EMV (Europay MasterCard Visa) is a globally
accepted standard for chip card-based payment transactions,
which benefits from the intrinsic security characteristics of chip
cards. The EMV specification is relatively flexible and can be
deployed in both online and offline card acceptance environments.
In the offline environment, payment terminals and cards only
communicate with each other in order to approve/decline the
payment transactions, whereas in the online environment au-
thorisation entities are also involved in the overall process. An
authorisation entity can either be the Card Issuing Bank (CIB)
or the payment scheme operator (e.g. Visa, Master-Card). Aside
from the transaction authorisation, the EMV specifications define
offline-PIN verification as one of the main cardholder verification
methods. However, in an online authorisation environment, the
PIN verification process is referred to as Online-PIN Verification
(OPV). This process is the main focus of this paper. We discuss
the OPV process that has placed indelible trust assumptions on
the intermediary entities (subcontractors) between a payment
terminal and a scheme operator/CIB. When this trust (assump-
tion) is scrutinised, there is a potential attack scenario that an
adversary can use to gain access to PIN data. This information
can be used by an adversary to carry out an online PIN approved
transaction without the involvement of the genuine cardholder but
with the correct PIN. We then propose three solutions based on
the existing OPV process as potential countermeasures that are
then implemented to measure any incurred performance penalties
and subjected to mechanical formal analysis using CasperFDR.
Keywords—EMV, Online PIN Verification, Security, Cryptogra-
phy, Implementation, Performance, CasperFDR.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart card-based payment (debit and credit) cards su-
perseded magnetic stripe cards to reduce card-based fraud
[1, 2]. In smart card-based systems [3], the sensitive data
related to the consumer and his/her card is securely stored
in a tamper-resistant chip [1, 4]. In addition, in this payment
system, the association between the payment card and its
authorised cardholder can also be established using a Personal
Identification Number (PIN). Theoretically, only the genuine
cardholder, the relevant smart card, the Card Issuing Bank
(CIB) and the Scheme Operator (SO)1 in stand-in process2
should know the PIN.
1Scheme Operator is a trusted broker that manages the payment scheme.
(e.g. Visa or MasterCard).
2Stand-in processing is a service where a scheme operator authenticates an
EMV transaction on behalf of a card issuing bank.
At the Card Terminal at Point of Sales (CTPOS)3, the
cardholder inserts her smart card into a card terminal, after
which the card and the terminal communicate with each
other and try to determine common parameters based on their
individual risk assessments in order to perform the transaction.
If the common parameters require cardholder authentication,
then the terminal will ask the consumer to enter her PIN. The
input value can be validated either by the smart card or by the
authorisation entity (i.e. scheme operator or CIB). If the PIN is
verified successfully then the card-holder is authenticated and
the transaction can proceed to the next step. Knowledge of the
PIN is regarded as an authorisation for the transaction from the
cardholder. It is an alternative to the cardholder’s signature
used to authorise a payment to the merchant. Payment card
fraud can be reduced, to some extend, through the use of a
smart card and it’s corresponding PIN [2, 5].
The security of the PIN is paramount from both the
cardholder’s and the payment environment’s point of view,
as explained further in section I-A. For this reason payment
terminals are designed to be secure and tamper-resistant in
order to safeguard transaction details including the PIN. The
PIN is also used in order to provide some assurance that the
genuine cardholder was present at the time of the transac-
tion. Of the two PIN verification scenarios that we discussed
previously (PIN verified by the card or by the authorisation
entity), the latter has a comparatively higher assurance value.
The process in which the PIN is verified by the authorisation
entity is referred as Online-PIN Verification (OPV), which is
the core focus of this paper.
A. Problem Statement
In the OPV process, between the CTPOS and the scheme
operator/card issuing bank, there might be a number of entities
that handle the communication. The EVM Card Specifica-
tion Book 4 recommends that this communication should
be adequately protected [6]. Understanding the OPV process
deployed in the ATM transactions [7] and elaborated in [8]–
[10], it is clear that the payment terminal requests the PIN from
the cardholder, then encrypts it and sends it to the authorisation
entity. According to the explanation in section II-A, it can
be assumed that during a transaction at a payment terminal
the PIN is encrypted using a symmetric key (which can be a
3This is a payment terminal at the merchants premises that accepts card-
based payments and it is referred to as CTPOS in this paper. For the purposes
of this study, a CTPOS is not an Automated Teller Machine (ATM).
session key with a limited lifespan) that it shares with the next
point of communication, which might not be the authorisation
entity. The next point deploys a key translation mechanism and
forwards the message to the next stage in the journey to the
authorisation entity.
Furthermore, the transaction authorisation message4 gener-
ated by the card, whose purpose is to get an online transaction
approval from the authorisation entity, has no binding with
the OPV process. This message consists of a number of EMV
tags that are then encrypted using a shared key (between the
card and the authorisation entity). One of the tags that make
up the ARQC is the Cardholder Verification Method (CVM)
mentioned in EMV Book 4, which indicates what method
is used to verify the cardholder [6]. The CVM is a three-
byte tag, with each byte representing the CVM performed,
CVM conditions and CVM results [6, see: p49]. The only
information in the CVM bytes regarding the OPV is a single
binary value set to 1 if CVM was performed [11, see: p162].
In the CVM or ARQC, there is no tag that binds the OPV
process and the respective ARQC. Also, during the OPV, only
the payment terminal handles the PIN and the card is not
informed of the PIN value entered on the terminal. Therefore,
if an adversary compromises one of the intermediate entities
that perform the key translation between the payment terminal
and the authorisation entity, he can obtain the PIN number
along with other transaction details. To perform this attack, the
adversary will observe all the OPV messages that include the
PINs and associated Primary Account Numbers (PAN). This
will enable the adversary to perform the OPV-based transaction
at a merchant’s premises with a stolen card for which the
adversary has previously obtained the relevant PIN.
Therefore, an attacker might be able to perform an EMV
transaction that requires online approval at a CTPOS. The
notion that an adversary can compromise an intermediary is
not hypothetical or far-fetched, as indicated by these reports
[12]–[14] and for the overall security of the payment scheme,
such scenarios should not be underestimated.
B. Contributions
Based on the problem discussed in the previous sections,
the following solutions are introduced to tackle the aforemen-
tioned problems:
1) To protect the PIN we have proposed an enhanced OPV
process using:
a) Card-based solution with symmetric cryptography.
b) Card-based solution with asymmetric cryptography.
c) Payment terminal-based solution with asymmetric
cryptography.
2) Binding each OPV with the respective ARQC (online
transaction authorisation).
C. Structure Of The Paper
The paper opens with a brief discussion of the EMV
Online-PIN Verification process in section II. Section III
details the assumptions regarding the payment networks oper-
ating environment, attacker’s capabilities, and potential attack
4In the EMV specifications, the transaction authorisation message is referred
to as an Authorisation Request Cryptogram (ARQC).
vectors that can be used by an adversary. In section IV, we
provide three potential countermeasures to the attack vectors
discussed in section III. We analyse our countermeasures
in section V. Finally, in section VI we provide concluding
remarks and potential future research directions.
II. EMV ONLINE PIN VERIFICATION
EMV supports both offline and online PIN verification
methods. In offline PIN verification the cardholder PIN is
sent to the card either in plaintext or enciphered format to be
verified. In contrast to this, during an Online-PIN Verification
(OPV) the PIN needs to be sent to the authorisation entity (e.g.
scheme operator or CIB) for verification.
A. CTPOS Online PIN Verification Process
The EMV specifications [6, 11, 15, 16] do not specify
the OPV process that may be supported by CTPOS devices.
Similarly, there are, to the best of the authors knowledge, no
publicly available documents that detail online PIN verification
in CTPOS. However, literature in the public domain such as
[8]–[10] highlights how OPV as a Cardholder Verification
Method (CVM) is carried out at an Automated Teller Machine
(ATM) during an ATM transaction. Considering how OPV is
processed in ATM transactions and according to our under-
standing gained from publicly available documents such as
[7], the process mentioned below outlines how OPV is carried
out in a CTPOS transaction in the current architecture.
In OPV, the communication path between the payment
terminal and the authorisation entity (i.e. SO/CIB) may consist
of numerous intermediaries such as; the acquirer’s subcon-
tractors who operate CTPOS devices, third party Payment
Terminal Operators (PTO) and other entities that engage in
key translation (where messages are enciphered and deciphered
from node to node). The current architecture has placed an
indelible trust assumption on the intermediaries involved. Most
of these intermediaries are bound by contracts with either
the acquirer or SO/CIB, yet it is questionable whether this
is sufficient to let intermediaries handle sensitive data related
to the cards and cardholders. The EMV specification [6] states
that “When the applicable CVM is online PIN, the Interface
Device (IFD) shall not issue a Verify command. Instead the
PIN pad shall encipher the PIN upon entry for transmission in
the authorisation or financial transaction request”.
This indicates that the PIN is sent in encrypted format
from the CTPOS onwards but the specification does not
mention PIN encipherment for OPV. Neither does it mention
whether the CTPOS encrypts the PIN with a cryptographic
key only shared with the authorisation entity or with the next
entity on the communication path. The CTPOS devices are
deployed by Payment Terminal Operators (PTO) as discussed
in our operating environment in section III-A. PTOs can be
merchants’ acquirers or third parties. A single third party may
deploy a significant number of CTPOS devices at different
merchants and manage them. Depending on area to area and
country to country, these third parties may differ and it is
not practically feasible for issuers to get in contact with all
the third parties globally, in order to share secret keys with
each other. Considering the number of different merchants’
acquirers, subcontractors, third parties and the number of
CTPOS devices, an authorisation entity sharing a specific key
with each individual CTPOS would be logistically impractical.
After all, one of the objectives of introducing EMV, was to
achieve the interoperability between different entities without
prior business relationships.
Fig. 1. Online PIN Verification Message Flow
Due to the need for these intermediaries to forward a
cardholder’s PIN in encrypted format in an OPV process
from one intermediary to another until the scheme operator
or CIB is reached, it can be assumed that a key translation
mechanism similar to the one used in ATMs is used in
OPV. A notable difference is that the ATM network is more
trusted and the ATMs themselves would also be considered
trusted. The process is carried out by intermediaries sharing
different cryptographic keys with each other as illustrated
in Figure 1. Considering the communication link between
intermediary A and the issuer for instance, the PIN block
which contains the PIN is first enciphered by intermediary A
using a shared key KAcq−A before it is send to the acquirer.
Once received, acquirer deciphers the message to obtain the
PIN block and subsequently enciphers it using the shared key
KAcq−B before forwarding to B. This process continues with
each intermediary node until the message is received by the
CIB.
III. POTENTIAL CONCERNS
In this section, we begin the discussion by describing
the operating environment and associated assumptions. Sub-
sequently, we discuss the attacker’s capability, then examine
two potential risk scenarios.
A. Operating Environment & Assumptions
Figure 2 shows an operating environment that is a repre-
sentation of a payment network. A Payment Terminal Operator
(PTO) might issue (or lease) their payment terminals to a
number of customers (merchants). The PTO can be an ac-
quiring bank but in our operating environment we assume two
scenarios: the PTO is a third party that manages the terminals
or it is an acquiring bank. The choice of who is the PTO does
not affect our operating environment and the risk scenarios
discussed later. There can be some additional nodes between
the PTO and the scheme operators. One of these additional
nodes must be the acquirer’s bank (in the event that the PTO
is a third party) or any additional number of entities that the
communication has to go through before arriving with the
scheme operator.
The scheme operator has a direct communication link
with the CIB. Each of the arrows shown in the figure 2
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Fig. 2. OPV Operating Enviroment
connecting two entities represents the communication link
and the arrowheads show the direction of communication. In
addition, each of the arrows has a different session key used
to secure the communication link. Each intermediary node and
scheme operator will perform key translation until the OPV
message is delivered to the CIB5.
In this study, we consider that the smart cards, payment
terminals, scheme operators and CIB are secure and trusted,
whereas the intermediary nodes that might have a connection
to the public internet have the potential to be compromised. Re-
cently, we have seen reports in which banking sector services
were successfully infiltrated by adversaries [13]. Therefore, the
assumption that intermediary nodes can be compromised is
reasonable [12]–[14]. Taking this operating environment and
our assumptions regarding the intermediary nodes and other
entities, we expand the discussion to the capabilities of our
adversary in the next section.
B. Attacker’s Capability
For the purposes of this discussion, the capabilities of an
adversary are given below:
1) Has the capability to compromise any of the intermediary
nodes.
2) Has the capability to access the OPV communication
in plaintext on the compromised intermediary node. As
in the operating environment discussed in section III-A,
individual intermediary nodes perform a key translation
process, which in essence decrypts the ingress message
and then encrypts, with a new key, the egress message.
3) Can not break the standard6 (strong) encryption algo-
rithms.
4) Can not compromise the smart cards, payment terminals,
scheme operator or CIB.
5) Might collude with other adversaries that steal smart cards
from genuine cardholders.
Based on the capabilities listed above, we describe two risk
scenarios in the subsequent section.
C. Two Potential Risk Scenarios
Based on the payment-networks operating environment,
our assumptions and the adversary’s capabilities, we discuss
two potential risk scenarios that might result in a successful
5In certain configurations, the OPV validation can be performed by the
scheme operator but in this paper we are not considering that option. However,
this does not have any effect on the risk scenarios.
6Standardised in the relevant up to date statement
compromise of the OPV and online transaction authorisation.
In both of these scenarios and in current transaction processes,
it is challenging to detect a fraudulent transaction due to the
adversary compromising the intermediary entity or a genuine
cardholder claiming that he did not perform the transaction.
1) Correct PIN in OPV Message: The adversary has com-
plete access to an intermediary node in our operating environ-
ment and he is observing all messages passing through it. In
this risk scenario, the compromise of a payment transaction is
carried out as follows:
1) The adversary observes the communication passing
through the compromised intermediary node and builds
a database of PIN numbers. This database contains the
Primary Account Number (PAN) and associated PIN.
2) A malicious accomplice M of the adversary steals a
smart card. The adversary matches the cards PAN with
the database. If a match is found then the adversary and
the accomplice know the associated PIN. Before the card
gets blocked by the CIB, the accomplice presents the card
to a (genuine) payment terminal, enters the correct PIN
and can perform online or offline payment transactions.
This issue is exacerbated if the payment transaction is
based on a magnetic stripe card and PIN. As in this case,
the adversary gets most of the necessary information to create
a clone magnetic stripe card and correct PIN. The clone card
can then be used in countries where magnetic stripe cards are
still in use.
2) OPV Response Message: In this risk scenario, a pay-
ment transaction is compromised in the following manner:
1) A malicious accompliceM of the adversary steals a smart
card and then presents this card to a payment terminal that
uses an intermediary node that is under total control of
the adversary.
2) M selects the payment terminal in a manner that will opt
in for the OPV process.
3) The payment terminal requests the cardholder (M) to
enter his PIN. M enters any random sequence at the
payment terminal. The terminal then encrypts this entered
PIN and sends it to the authorisation entity over the
network.
4) The adversary captures this message. Whether it allows
the message to go forward to the authorisation entity or
not makes no difference7. The adversary then replays a
successful OPV verification response message generated
by the CIB (observed in previous genuine transactions)
back to the terminal. The adversary has observed this
successful message in previous runs of the OPV process
and can just replay it to the payment terminal.
5) The payment terminal will receive a successful PIN veri-
fication message and proceeds to request the smart card to
generate an online transaction authorisation message (i.e.
ARQC) in the 1st GENERATE AC command [16]. The
card generated ARQC is then sent to the authorisation
entity. The authorisation entity verifies the ARQC and
does a credit check on the users account. If satisfied, the
authorisation entity generates an Authorisation Response
7Authorisation entities (e.g. scheme operators and CIBs) do not link the
OPV process with the online transaction authorisation (i.e. ARQC [6])
Code (ARC). The ARC is then Xored with the ARQC
and then enciphered using the session key shared with the
card to construct an Authorisation Response Cryptogram
(ARPC) to approve the transaction. The ARPC is then
sent back to the CTPOS. The ARPC could also be in the
form of a Message Authentication Code (MAC).
6) The CTPOS forwards the ARPC to the card and request
an outcome in the 2nd GENERATE AC command [16].
The card after verifying the valid ARPC, generates a
Transaction Certificate (TC) and sends it to the CTPOS.
7) CTPOS now accepts the card transaction and either sends
the TC straight for payment processing or stores it for
payment processing at a later time. The attack is possible
due to lack of strong binding between the OPV and the
ARQC.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
We propose three solutions that address the aforementioned
concerns in section III and guarantee end-to-end security of
OPV between the payment card and the CIB. Furthermore,
the solutions introduce minimal or no changes to the inter-
mediaries involved in the current EMV architecture between
the payment terminal and scheme operator/CIB. To meet our
objective, the changes we propose are only made to the
payment cards, the CIB who has full ownership of the issued
payment cards and their back-end authorisation systems, and
to the CTPOS devices.
This makes the OPV process more secure within the threat
model we discussed in section III-C by not needing a strong
trust assumption for the involved intermediaries. The solutions
are categorised into card-based and terminal-based solutions
depending on which entity the PIN block encipherment occurs
in during OPV.
There are no details provided in the EMV specifications in
regard to the PIN block construction and encipherment for
OPV [6, 11, 15, 16]. However, the process of PIN block
construction and encipherment that happens at the CTPOS
in an offline PIN verification where the enciphered PIN is
sent to the card is specified in [16]. Standards such as ISO-
9564-1 & ISO-9564-1 and similar guidelines given in [7]
make recommendations on how PINs and associated account
information need to be protected during transmission from one
system to another. Since there is no publicly available standard
on how PIN block construction and encipherment should be
carried out in OPV, we have made reasonable assumptions in
our PIN block construction and encipherment.
In order to explain the three, proposed solutions more
clearly, we first introduce a generic OPV model on which our
proposals are based. The protocol diagram shown in figure 3
llustrates this.
In the generic protocol, the CTPOS sends the payment
card a generated session key SKT and the cardholder entered
PIN either in plaintext or in enciphered format. If the PIN
is sent to the card in enciphered format, the CTPOS may
use the card’s public key recovered from the card’s public
key certificate, or the CTPOS may use a card owned PIN
encipherment public key (if the card contains a dedicated key
pair for PIN encipherment) as specified in EMV standard [16,
see: p81]. However, it must be noted that if the PIN is sent
CARD CTPOS Intermediary Authoriser
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OPVrq
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Fig. 3. Generic OPV Protocol Diagram
enciphered in a PIN block, the purpose of this message is for
the card to retrieve the PIN, but not to respond to a VERIFY
command carried out in offline PIN verification.
The payment card after receiving the message from CT-
POS, constructs a PIN block which contains the PIN and
details of the corresponding account number according to
ISO-9564-1 & ISO-9564-1. The data included in the OPV
PIN Block are shown in Table I. The Unpredictable Numbers
(UN) mentioned in this study have the same properties as
defined in the EMV specification [16]. The encipherment is
done inside the card using a symmetric session key shared
with the Authoriser, who may represent either the scheme
operator or the CIB during OPV. We call this encipherment,
OPV Enciphered PIN Block, that has the notation e{PB}.
For the encipherment of both the OVP PIN Block (PB)
and the OPV PIN Result Block (PRB) using a symmetric
encryption algorithm, we make our construction support three
symmetric encipherment methods as detailed below;
1) Basic Encryption: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[17] as the symmetric encryption algorithm with Cipher
Feedback Mode (CFB) as the mode of operation.
2) Encrypt-then-MAC: Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) as the symmetric encryption algorithm with Cipher
Feedback Mode (CFB) as the mode of operation and a key
based Message Authentication Code (MAC) computed
using SHA256 to provide integrity.
3) Authenticated Encryption: Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (AES) as the symmetric encryption algorithm and
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) [18, 19] as the mode of
operation is used as a combined single operation to
provide authenticated encryption.
Due to space restrictions, three separate messages detailing
each of the symmetric encryption process are not included in
this section but instead the symmetric encipherment of the
OPV PIN Block which has the notation “e{PB}” represents
any one of the three cryptographic processes detailed above de-
pending on which one is selected. Depending on the symmetric
encryption method used to create e{PB}, the CIB selects the
same symmetric encryption method to encipher the OPV PIN
Result Block (PRB) to create the enciphered OPV PIN Results
Block “e{PRB}”.
In our practical implementation as detailed in section V-B,
however, we implement and measure the performance penal-
ties of both symmetric and asymmetric encryption methods
proposed in each of our solution. The findings are outlined in
Tables VII.
In our generic protocol outlined here, for the symmetric
encipherment of the OPV PIN Block, we use basic encryption
mode with three blocks of 16 bytes each with a total length
(L) of 48 bytes. In our practical implementation for this, we
used 128bit - Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [17] with
Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) as the mode of operation.
TABLE I. OPV PIN BLOCK (PB)
Data Header : 1 Byte.
PIN Block : 8 Bytes.
Card Unpredictable Number (CUN) : 16 Bytes.
CTPOS Session Key (SKT ) : 16 Bytes.
Random Padding (L = 48 = length of encipherment ) : L− 41.
The payment card then constructs an Online PIN Verifi-
cation Request (OPVrq) message addressed to the Authoriser
which includes a concatenation of the personal account number
(PAN) of the card (this could be a unique ID of that individual
payment card), and the enciphered OPV PIN block e{PB}.
The e{PB} is enciphered using a session key shared between
the smart card and the CIB.
OPV rq = PAN ||e{PB}
The constructed OPVrq is then sent to the CTPOS, where
the CTPOS device in this instance follows the existing EMV
process and encrypts the PIN-related data it receives, using the
key it shares with the next entity on the communication path,
which may be the acquirer or an intermediary in the current
EMV architecture. The OPVrq is forwarded in this way until
it reaches the Authoriser.
The Authoriser uses the PAN to retrieve the shared session
key and then decipher e{PB}. The PIN is then validated and
the outcome is included in an OPV PIN Result Block (PRB).
The PRB includes data as shown in Table II.
TABLE II. OPV PIN RESULT BLOCK (PRB)
Data Header : 1 Byte.
Cardholder V erification Result(CV R) : 5 Bytes.
Authoriser Unpredictable Number : 16 Bytes.
Card Unpredictable Number : 16 Bytes.
The Authoriser then constructs the Online PIN Verification
Response (OPVrp) which is an encipherment, in this instance,
of the PRB using the session key SKT of the CTPOS. The
notation below is used to show the symmetric encryption of
PRB using the key SKT .
OPV rp = e{PRB}
The constructed OPVrp is then sent to the same commu-
nication path, which may go through the same acquirer and
intermediaries in the current EMV architecture until the OPVrp
is reached by the CTPOS, which then deciphers the message
to obtain the PIN verification results.
Once the CTPOS is satisfied with the OPVrp, it will
transfer this message to the card. According to our threat
model we have assumed that the payment card, CTPOS and
scheme operator/CIB are trusted entities. EMV transaction
authorisation continues following the OPV process described
above.
A. Card Based Solutions
In our proposed card-based solution, the PB is enciphered
inside the payment card before it is forwarded to the CIB
(Authoriser in our generic model) to be verified. The card-
based solutions are further sub-categorised, depending on
whether a symmetric or an asymmetric cryptographic key is
used to encipher the PB.
1) Card uses an online-PIN encipherment symmetric key
of the CIB: The solution described here introduces an online-
PIN encipherment symmetric key KOPV that the payment card
shares with the CIB. From the KOPV , a session key KSOPV
is derived using a key derivation function similar to the one
specified in EMV specification [16, see: p127 - p131] and also
discussed in [4]. It is assumed that the session key derivation
between the card and the CIB is synchronised.
When the card is inserted in the CTPOS, in this instance,
the CTPOS sends the PIN that the cardholder enters to the
payment card, either in plain text or in encrypted format. The
CTPOS also sends the session key SKT . The OPV process in
this solution follows exactly the same steps as described in the
generic OPV model above. Considering the ownership of the
payment card by the CIB, the necessary changes are under the
control of the CIB.
2) Card uses an online-PIN encipherment public key of the
CIB: The solution described here introduces an online-PIN
encipherment public key POPVCIB of the CIB. It must be noted
that this is not the CIB’s public key that is recovered from
the CIB’s public key certificate residing in the card during
EMV transactions. The POPVCIB in this context refers to a
specific online-PIN encipherment public key introduced in our
construction. This key is stored in the payment card by the CIB
during card personalisation and is in the format of a public key
certificate that has been signed by the CIB.
Similar to our generic model, the CTPOS first sends a
session key SKT and the customer-entered PIN either in
plain text or in enciphered format to the card. The card then
constructs the PB-1. The data included in the PB-1 are shown
in Table III. In this occasion, PB-1 is enciphered using the
public key POPVCIB to generate the enciphered OVP PIN
Block that has the notation z{PB-1}.
TABLE III. OPV PIN BLOCK -1 (PB-1)
Data Header : 1 Byte.
PIN Block : 8 Bytes.
Card Unpredictable Number (CUN) : 16 Bytes.
CTPOS Session Key (SKT ) : 16 Bytes.
Random Padding (N = length of POPVCIB ) : N − 41.
The payment card then constructs the OPVrq message
which includes the PAN and the public key encipherment of
PB-1.
OPV rq = PAN ||z{PB − 1}
The OPVrq is sent to the CTPOS, where the CTPOS
device now follows the existing EMV process and encrypts
the PIN-related data with the key it shares with the next entity
on the communication path. The OPVrq is forwarded from
entity to entity until it reaches the CIB. CIB then decrypts
the PIN-related data and verifies whether the PIN entered by
the cardholder is correct. The outcome of this verification is
constructed in an OPV PIN Result Block (PRB-1) shown in
Table IV
TABLE IV. OPV PIN RESULT BLOCK -1 (PRB-1)
Data Header : 1 Byte.
Cardholder V erification Result(CV R) : 5 Bytes.
CIB Unpredictable Number : 16 Bytes.
Card Unpredictable Number : 16 Bytes.
The CIB then constructs the OPVrp, which is the encipher-
ment of the PRB-1 using the session key SKT of CTPOS.
OPV rp = e{PRB − 1}
This message is then sent back using the same communi-
cation path until the CTPOS is reached. The CTPOS then de-
ciphers e{PRB-1} and verifies the CVR. Once satisfied, this
is passed to the payment card. EMV transaction authorisation
continues following the OPV process we described above.
B. Terminal-Based Solutions
In this solution, the PIN block is enciphered at the CTPOS
before it gets sent forward to the CIB to be verified. In contrast
to the previous two solutions, the cardholder-entered PIN is not
sent to the card but instead is enciphered in the CTPOS.
1) Terminal uses an online-PIN encipherment public key of
the CIB: An online-PIN encipherment public key POPVCIB
of the CIB is introduced to carry out the OPV PIN Block
encipherment at the CTPOS. The public key is stored in the
payment card in a public key certificate, similar to the proposal
in section IV-A2, and during a transaction the certificate is
given to the CTPOS. During a transaction, the card provides;
the CIB’s public key certificate signed by a Certification
Authority (CA) and the CIB’s online-PIN encipherment public
key certificate signed by the CIB. The CTPOS uses the CA’s
public verification key to verify that the CIB’s public key was
signed by the CA and then uses the CIB’s public key to verify
that POPVCIB was signed by the CIB. The CTPOS can then
validate the public key POPVCIB recovered from the certificate
and use this to create the public key encipherment of PB-2
that has the notation z{PB-2}. The OPV PIN Block PB-2
includes data mentioned in Table V.
TABLE V. OPV PIN BLOCK -2 (PB-2)
Data Header : 1 Byte.
PIN Block : 8 Bytes.
CTPOS Unpredictable Number : 16 Bytes.
CTPOS Session Key (SKT ) : 16 Bytes.
Random Padding (N = length of POPVCIB ) : N − 41.
The CTPOS then constructs the OPVrq message which
includes the PAN and the public key encipherment of the OPV
PIN Block as shown below.
OPV rq = PAN ||z{PB − 2}
The OPVrq is then sent to the next entity in the path of
communication to the CIB. Once received, the CIB decrypts
z{PB-2} and verifies whether the PIN entered by the user is
correct or not. The verification is included in a CVR. The CIB
then constructs a OPV PIN Result Block (PRB-2) shown in
Table VI
TABLE VI. OPV PIN RESULT BLOCK -2 (PRB-2)
Data Header : 1 Byte.
Cardholder V erification Result(CV R) : 5 Bytes.
CIB Unpredictable Number : 16 Bytes.
CTPOS Unpredictable Number : 16 Bytes.
The CIB then constructs the OPVrp which is the encipher-
ment of the PIN result block using the session key SKT of
CTPOS.
OPV rp = e{PRB − 2}
The OPVrp is then sent back along the same communi-
cation path until it reaches the CTPOS, which then deciphers
the encrypted PIN result block and retrieves the CVR. Once
satisfied, the CTPOS will generate other commands if the
transaction proceeds to transaction authorisation.
C. Binding of OPV and Transaction Authorisation
In the current EMV process there seems to be no direct
linkage between the online PIN verification and the online
transaction authorisation for a given EMV transaction. The two
verifications are carried out separately, leaving space for replay
attacks in which a harvested OPV Response Message could be
replayed or injected by the compromised intermediary during
an EMV transaction.
Both of our card-based and terminal-based proposals dis-
cussed in sections IV-A, IV-B help to eliminate the afore-
mentioned attacks by making a minor change to the cur-
rent EMV transaction authorisation message. In an online
transaction authorisation process the payment card generates
an Authorisation Request Cryptogram (ARQC) in response
to the GENERATE AC command issued by the CTPOS
[11, 16]. Here the payment card can include the Authoriser
Unpredictable Number that is sent back to the CTPOS in the
OPV PIN Result Block (PRB) as discussed in our generic
OPV model in Section IV and shown in Table II, inside the
ARQC, which is a symmetric encipherment using the shared
key between the card and the Authoriser.
Once the Authoriser receives the ARQC and deciphers it,
the Authoriser can use the Authoriser Unpredictable Number
that it keeps a record of to link the previously verified OPV
to the received transaction authorisation request. This gives
assurance to the Authoriser that this is a genuine and timely
transaction. The Authoriser may also include a combined ver-
ification result inside the Authorisation Response Cryptogram
(ARPC) when the ARPC is sent back to the card.
V. ANALYSIS
In this section, we take the proposed solutions presented
in the previous section and evaluate them for their security
and performance. The security of the proposed solutions is
analytically evaluated in relation to the attackers capability
and performance measurements are taken to show the potential
penalties for the existing process if they are adopted.
A. Analytical Analysis
Taking into account the adversary capabilities discussed in
section III-B, a malicious user (adversary) can compromise
an intermediary entity. The adversary cannot compromise the
smart cards, payment terminals, scheme operator, or CIB. This
limitation is imposed because if an adversary can successfully
compromise any of these entities then almost no protection
mechanism would be strong enough to protect against attacks
on the OPV process. The rationale behind this is described
below:
1) The smart card stores a copy of the authorised PIN,
which it uses to compare with the value entered by the
cardholder during an offline PIN-based transaction. If an
adversary can break the tamper-resistant smart card to
access the PIN, then he could potentially access any other
information on it, thus rendering any countermeasure,
including ours, redundant. Fundamentally, he can create a
clone of the genuine smart card and perform transactions
with the correct PIN.
2) If the adversary can successfully compromise a terminal,
then he can access the authorised PIN whenever a genuine
cardholder uses it. However, in this attack the adversary
will only capture the PINs of the cards used on a single
payment terminal.
3) An authorisation entity (e.g. scheme operator and CIB),
similar to the payment cards, has to store copies of au-
thorised PINs for authentication purposes. If an adversary
compromises the authorisation entity then it is challenging
to protect the PINs and the OPV process (even with our
proposal).
In our proposed solutions, the smart card issued by the
respective CIB either encrypts itself or gives the encryption
(public) key to the payment terminal to be used for secure
communication (OPVrq). The CIB, on receiving this mes-
sage, decrypts the OPVrq and verifies the PIN. The response
(OPVrp) of whether to indicate a successful PIN verification or
not is sent back to the payment terminal. The payment terminal
generates the session key that encrypts the OPVrp, which is
included in the OPVrq by either the smart card or the terminal.
The response message also includes a random number gener-
ated by the smart card or payment terminal (depending upon
which proposed solution is selected), providing assurance of
the freshness of the OPVrp message.
An adversary observing these messages can store them
for the purpose of replaying them at some later stage. The
adversary cannot see the PIN in plaintext as he does not have
the capability of breaking a strong cryptographic algorithm.
For the solution based on the symmetric key and encryption
performed by the smart card, a replay of the OPVrq will be
easily detected as the session key used for encrypting (and
successful decryption) this message would have expired.
TABLE VII. PERFORMANCE PENALTIES ASSOCIATED WITH EACH SOLUTION
Proposed Solutions Basic Encryption Encrypt-then-MAC Authenticated EncryptionJava Card 1 Java Card 2 Java Card 1 Java Card 2 Java Card 1 Java Card 2
Symmetric Key Card 64ms 86ms 138ms 156ms 122ms 136ms
Asymmetric Key Card 138ms 159ms 196ms 218ms - -
Asymmetric Key Payment Terminal8 34ms 48ms -
CIB OPVrp (footnote 7) 16ms 28ms 22ms
However, for solutions based on an asymmetric cryptosys-
tem (e.g. using public key of the CIB) the smart card or the
payment terminal generates a session (symmetric) key that is
then used by the CIB to encrypt the OPVrp. If the adversary
replays the OPVrq message, generated using the public key of
the CIB, the session key part of the replayed message would
be different. As a result, the payment terminal may not be able
to decrypt the OPVrp message properly, avoiding a successful
replay of the OPVrq message.
To provide binding between the OPV process and the
online transaction authorisation, we have proposed, including
a random number generated by the authorisation entity in the
online transaction authorisation. This provides a countermea-
sure against an adversary taking advantage of the lack of
binding between the OPV process and the online transaction
authorisation.
Consider a potential scenario in which an adversary creates
a “Yes” card [1]. In this scenario, the OPV process has to
execute the first two proposed solutions (based on the smart
card). The payment terminal communicates the PIN entered
by the malicious user to the “Yes” card and it generates an
OPVrq message. The intention is that when the authorisation
entity tries to verify the OPVrq and fails, it will send a PIN
verification decline result back in the OPVrp. As this response
goes back to the “Yes” card, it simply discards this message
and tells the payment terminal that the PIN verification was
successful. However, this scenario requires that the OPVrq is
completely isolated from the payment terminal. In our proposal
the symmetric key used to encipher the OPVrp message is
generated by the payment terminal (and communicated to
the authorisation entity in OPVrq). Therefore, the payment
terminal can also decrypt the message and verify whether
the PIN was verified or not. Hence, this potential scenario
might not be able to circumvent the protection provided by
our proposals.
Another concern that could be raised would be the use of
a standard Initialisation Vector (IV) [20] for the symmetric
cryptosystem. We are discussing this as there is the potential
that patterns in the ciphertext might reveal some information
regarding the PIN. To avoid this (even when the IV is a
predefined value), in the OPVrq message, we append a random
number generated by the smart card to the data header and then
append the PIN value. This way, the first 16 byte (plaintext)
block to be used by the symmetric algorithm (i.e. AES [17])
will have 15 random bytes and the first byte of the second
block will also be random (the 16 byte random number is
spread over the first two plaintext blocks). This randomness
in the plaintext of the first block avoids any patterns being
detected in the second block, which contains the PIN. Fur-
thermore, the session keys are unique for the symmetric key-
based proposals, making it difficult for an adversary to gain
any additional information from the OPVrq or OPVrp message
about the PIN or the associated decision.
B. Practical Implementation
In this section, we describe our implementation of the
proposed solutions with the aim of providing potential per-
formance penalties the existing OPV process has to bear. For
our test bed, we selected two 32bit Java Cards [21] connected
with a Microsoft Windows 7 machine running on 2.3GHz, 2GB
RAM as a CTPOS and CIB (for OPVrp). For the symmetric
key based solution, we selected Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) [17], 128bit key. In basic encryption and Encrypt-then-
MAC we use the Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB). Whereas,
for authenticated encryption we have opted for Galois/Counter
Mode (GCM) [18, 19]. For the generation of the random
number [22] we selected the HMAC-based Pseudorandom
Number Generator (PRNG)9 .
For the implementation of the public key-based solutions,
we selected 1048bit RSA (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman) [23]
with random padding generated by the selected PRNG. The
session keys used in this solution were also generated using the
same selected PRNG. The performance penalty is illustrated
in the table VII and each measurement is represented in
milliseconds (ms). A point to note is that there is no au-
thenticated encryption mode (similar to GCM) for asymmetric
cryptosystems (i.e. RSA). Therefore, there is not performance
measurement for it included in the table VII.
Our implementation does not emulate the complete EVM
specifications. It only implements the proposed modifications
to the OPVrq and OPVrp. The performance measurement
should be taken as an additional execution cost that the EVM
process has to bear to implement the proposed solutions in this
paper.
C. Mechanical Formal Analysis
In this section, we subject the proposed modifications to a
mechanical formal analysis based on the CasperFDR tool.
The CasperFDR approach was adopted to test the sound-
ness of the proposal under the defined security properties. In
this approach, the Casper compiler [24] takes a high-level
description of the protocol, together with its security require-
ments. It then translates the description into the process algebra
of Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [25]. The CSP
description of the protocol can be machine-verified using the
Failures-Divergence Refinement (FDR) model checker [26].
The intruder’s capability modelled in the Casper script (ap-
pendices A and B) for the proposed protocol is:
1) Intruder can masquerade any entity in the network
2) Intruders can read the messages transmitted in the network
3) Intruder cannot influence the internal process of an entity
in the network
9PRNGs based on different cryptographic algorithms can give different
performances; a detailed discussion of this can be found in [22]
The security specification for which the CasperFDR eval-
uates the network is as shown below. The listed specifications
are defined in the #Specification section of appendices A and
B:
1) The protocol run is fresh and both applications were alive,
2) The key used for encryption/decryption in the symmetric
system and the private key used for decryption in the
asymmetric system, is not revealed to the adversary,
3) Long terms keys of communicating entities are not com-
promised, and
The CasperFDR tool evaluated the protocol and did not
find any feasible attack(s).
VI. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we briefly described an OPV process that is
based on publicly available information. The architecture of the
payment network for the OPV and subsequently for the online
transaction authorisation was explained. This payment network
and its associated deployment open up a potential route for
an adversary to compromise it to his benefit. We detailed
our assumptions regarding the payment network’s operating
environment, the capabilities of an adversary and potential
attack scenarios. Subsequently, we proposed three potential
ways to enhance the OPV process and a proposal of how
to bind it to the online transaction authorisation. Proposed
solutions were then analysed with a discussion on their security
in the context of the adversary’s capabilities. We also provided
the execution measurements for our proposed modifications;
this showed the potential performance penalty incurred by
our proposals. Furthermore, proposed modifications were then
subjected to the mechnical formal anlysis using the CasperFDR
tool. The concerns raised by this paper are considered to
be valid as the OPV and online transaction authorisation
is considered the highest level of trust in the card-based
payment mechanism. It can differ based on laws/regulations
or the relationship between the cardholder and CIB, but if
the correct PIN is used in an OPV and online transaction
authorisation then the liability of the payment is either with
the cardholder or the CIB. If attacks can successfully occur
at this level they could potentially cause substantial reputation
damage to the overall card-based payment scheme, along with
causing financial loss to the cardholder/CIB. Furthermore, such
attacks could make it difficult to detect whether an OPV-
based transaction was actually made by the cardholder or the
adversary, as the compromise of the intermediary nodes might
not be detected in time. Therefore, we consider this to be
a concern and suggest that a mandating rollout of an OPV
process in a geographical region should take into consideration
these concerns and our potential solutions.
As part of our future research directions, we aim to explore
the payment architecture for contactless payment systems and
evaluate it with respect to issues similar to those presented in
this study. The significance of PIN capture for contactless cards
would be higher as the potential for successful transactions
using relay attacks will increase. We will also evaluate key
sharing schemes between payment terminal providers and their
payment terminals (at merchants’ sites).
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APPENDIX A
CASPERFDR SCRIPT - SYMMETRIC SYSTEM
#Free variables
SC, CI: Agent
Dh, Pb, Rp, Cvr; Num
Cun, Aun: Nonce
InverseKeys = (EnMaKey, EnMaKey),
(SessionEnMaKey, SessionEnMaKey)
#Protocol description
0. -> SC : SC [CI!=SC] <iMsg :={Dh, Pb,
Cun,SessionEnMaKey,Rp}{EnMaKey}>
1. SC -> CI : SC, iMsg
2. CI -> SC : {DH,Cvr, Aun,
Cun}{SessionEnMaKey}
#Actual variables
SCard, CIssuer, ME: Agent
DH, PB, RP, CVR: Num
CUN, AUN, NMalicious: Nonce
#Processes
INITIATOR(SC,CI, Cun) knows EnMaKey
RESPONDER(CI,SC, Aun) knows EnMaKey
#System
INITIATOR(SCard, SIssuer, CUN)
RESPONDER(SIssuer, SCard, AUN)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = ME
IntruderKnowledge = {SIssuer, SCard, ME,
GMalicious, NMalicious}
#Specification
Aliveness(SI, SC)
Aliveness(SC, SI)
Secret(SC, EnMaKey, [CI])
Secret(Sc, SessionEnMaKey, [CI])
APPENDIX B
CASPERFDR SCRIPT - ASYMMETRIC SYSTEM
#Free variables
SC, CI: Agent
Dh, Pb, Rp, Cvr; Num
Cun, Aun: Nonce
EKey: Agent->PublicKey
DKey: Agent->SecretKey
InverseKeys = (VKey, SKey), (SessionEnMaKey,
SessionEnMaKey)
#Protocol description
0. -> SC : SC [CI!=SC] <iMsg := {Dh, Pb,
Cun, SessionEnMaKey, Rp}{EKey(CI)}>
1. SC -> CI : SC, iMsg
2. SC -> CI : {Dh, Cvr, Aun,
Cun}{SessionEnMaKey}
#Actual variables
SCard, CIssuer, ME: Agent
DH, PB, RP, CVR: Num
CUN, AUN, NMalicious: Nonce
#Processes
INITIATOR(SC,CI, Cun)knows EKey
RESPONDER(SC,SI, Aun) knows DKey(CI), EKey
#System
INITIATOR(CIssuer, SCard, CUN)
RESPONDER(SCard, CIssuer, AUN)
#Functions
symbolic EKey, DKey
#Intruder Information
Intruder = ME
IntruderKnowledge = {CIssuer, SCard, ME,
NMalicious, DKey(ME), EKey}
#Specification
Aliveness(CI, SC)
Aliveness(SC, CI)
Secret(SC, SessionEnMaKey, [CI])
